

2 Dec 2015

The ally of my ally or just my ally



There is the old idea written in one of the 15 Sanskrit military books called the Arthashastra. In this body of work it is purported to have been written that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. Time and time again this idea has been proven wrong and has actually turned out to be 'the enemy of my enemy is still my enemy'.

If you replace the word 'enemy' with 'competitor' and 'friend' with 'ally' you get the competitor of my competitor is my ally when in actuality the competitor of my competitor is my competitor.

After nearly 45 years of having to deal with 'allies' and competitors', I have found one truth and that is to learn what your competitors offer and ensure that your offering will do no harm by doing only good.

So who are my allies and competitors? I will need to go back to 1974 to start this journey, please refer to the following table - Use of Links: <Name> Wikipedia; <Reason> further details in this document:

Date	Ally	Competitor	Result
1974	Vancouver Uni IBM	None	Leant all about the hierarchical data base structure (Van/DL1)
1976	Ted Codd	Charles Bachman	Learnt 3 rd normal form (nf) data normalisation
1978	As above plus MA Jackson	As above plus General program logic theory	How to structure a program based on input and output structures
1980	As above	As above plus E Yourdon & de Marco	For me the Jackson system development (JSD) approach trumped data flow diagrams
1982	As above plus Clive Finklestein Peter Drucker Michael Porter Bob Smith	As above plus James Martin - reason ; John Zachman ; - reason Object orientation ;	Introduced JSD into the information engineering methodology. Learnt more about 4 th nf. Designed and developed User:Data
1986	Chris Mrakas	As above	Chris became the software development manager when Bob Smith resigned
1988	Some close associates	As above plus; Clive Finklestein - reason ; Ted Codd - reason ; Peter Drucker - reason ; Michael Porter - reason ; Rational UML - reason	Broke away from IE and started to do research and development into a more explicit approach to strategic planning, data analysis and data base design. A year later I was approached by Chris to form a new consulting group (Infornetics consulting)
1989	Some close associates	Chris Mrakas - reason	Left Infornetics and continued with my research
1990	Some close associates	As above plus Geram ; NIST EA ; Knowledge management ; Business process reengineering	Released v1 of the Ripose compilers (Caspar): Explicit phases; 5th, 6th and domain key nf; Documentation: Proof of concept; Proof of logic
1994 - date	As above	As above plus Balanced scorecard ; TOGAF ; FEAF ; PEAF ; Macroscope ; + 900+ more. See my training portal	My advice: If you find one piece of implicit advice in the framework that you are using or intend to use, either get it clarified or change your framework.

So as the list of my competitors grow, so too do theirs. There are 900+ different enterprise architecture frameworks on the market today. Some have software support but none of them (as far as my studies have shown) have a software tool designed explicitly for their use. For an expanded view and definitions please [follow this link](#).

Reason why an ally became a competitor

James Martin – strictly speaking James Martin was never my ally, but as he was an ally of my ally (Clive Finklestein, before I met him) I need to record the history of betrayal after trust (treasonable act) in order to be explicit:

- Circa 1980 – Clive and James Martin (both ex IBM) collaborated and co-authored a book on Information Engineering. As James Martin was a recognised author of many books and information technology ‘guru’ it would help boost the popularity of the information engineering methodology
- July 1982 – due to my experience in Ted Codd’s normalisation technique Adrian Tidswell (the then joint managing director of Information Engineering Australia – IEA) employed me to redesign their data analysis course
- Oct 1982 – Clive was given an ultimatum by the second joint managing director of IEA to either fire Adrian, or he would resign. Clive chose to let Adrian go, so in essence I lost my only ally
- Nov 1982 (whilst Clive was still in the USA) the managing director, marketing manager and senior consultant of IEA, resigned en masse and joined the newly formed company called 'Doll Martin' (a joint venture between Dixon Doll and James Martin). I think their main aim was to cause the demise of IEA as they got Clive to hand over all of IEA's clients under a sub contract clause claiming that as IEA did not have a consultant to service the contracts, it was in the best interest of the clients and IEA

In my opinion, this was a treasonable offence.

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Clive Finklestein – After the mass resignation of the 3 senior IEA stakeholders, Clive decided to appoint me as the technical director of IEA in order for me to revamp the ie methodology and redesign and write the supporting data dictionary software (User:Data) to support the methodology.

- 1985 – IEA listed on the second board and I managed to acquire a 1% shareholding in the company. I was unable to purchase more shares as the bank (whose subsidiary had originally required a 51% private holding of IEA) did not consider me as a reliable risk for a loan
- 1986 – Information Engineering awarded a prestigious \$6 million USA Navy contract ahead of organisations such as IBM, James Martin & Associates, Texas Instruments and Arthur Andersens (now Accenture) based on the revamped methodology and the data repository and system that I had designed and programmed. I was appointed VP of technology of the USA consulting firm and relocated to Washington DC
- 1987 – After a series of technical disagreements with Clive (he wanted to develop the program generator, whilst I was concerned that the strategic planning component of User:Data needed a great deal of work), I returned to Australia to discuss the future technical direction with the R&D manager (Chris Mrakas)
- Jan 1988 – After a discussion with Chris (where I convinced him that the priority was to tackle the strategic planning component rather than the generator) and after another argument with Clive, I was finally given the go ahead to proceed with the strategic planning component. I promptly resigned as my position had become untenable by having to gain the support of a manager that actually did not report to me in order to convince a less technical savvy director as to the IT strategy

Hence Clive and I were now estranged and he became my competitor.

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Ted Codd – In 1976 I joined Castrol (South Africa) as a systems analyst and was sent on a BIS Schrapnel course. It was then that I was taught Ted Codd's method of normalising data to 3rd normal form. Even then I was not fully convinced that 3rd nf was the ideal state as the rule of 3nf demanded that the attribute had to depend on the primary key of the entity to which it belonged. As the primary key was in essence a fictitious attribute (implicit information), I found it difficult to agree that a real attribute owed its placement in an entity based solely on a fictitious attribute. Once I discovered 4, 5th and 6th nf and developed the knowledge model (explicit information), the placement of attributes no longer depended on normalisation techniques.

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Peter Drucker – although I did not personally meet nor ally myself directly with Peter Drucker he was in essence an ally of another ally of mine.

- 1983 – Clive Finklestein employed a Professor Birkett to handle the strategic planning component of the ie methodology. It was around this time that I was introduced to the works of Peter Drucker and read a number of his books. However after I asked Professor Birkett as to what strategic planning deliverable he was able to supply me in order for me to do my work identifying the data a client would need to support the strategic plan, I was informed that apart from a colourful strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats graph (implicit information) he had nothing else to offer
- 1991 – my research led me to identify the explicit information required to address the conceptual information requirements covering business objectives, knowledge and strategies
- 2001 – I undertook a study of the courses the Harvard School of Management had set up (under the auspices of Peter Drucker) for their MBA and Executive MBA degree. What I discovered was truly frightening. Of the 23 subjects necessary to be studied for the MBA degree 17 addressed business objectives and 6 strategies. Of the 40 subjects for the Executive MBA, 18 addressed business objectives, 21 strategies and only 1 knowledge. Hence for anyone studying an MBA would have to take 35 subjects to cover business objectives, 27 strategies and 1 knowledge.

Needless to say the comparison between the eminent Peter Drucker's work and mine made him my competitor rather than an ally

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Chris Mrakas – Chris Mrakas was hired by the then IEA R&D manager Bob Smith as a software implementation specialist in 1985 and never truly reported to me by to the R&D manager as the structure of the company was that all senior managers reported directly to the CEO. As technical director I had little or no say in anything the CEO or the chairman of the board decided.

- 1986 – Chris became R&D manager once Bob Smith resigned
- 1988 – IEA went into receivership. Somehow (unbeknown by me) the CEO and Chris managed to purchase the rights to the User:Data system that I was instrumental in designing and developing. I was given no opportunity to participate in making a counter offer for my software
- 1989 – I was approached by Chris to form Infornetics Consulting to help them integrate my latest research into their data dictionary product. They had already managed to acquire a few remaining customers of IEA and hence the software company had a financial base to write their software in C++ on the Linux operating system platform. After 9 months of association I discovered that Chris had bought the rights to User:Data and that his programmers had used my data base design and program logic. When I approached Chris with the view to obtaining a share in the software company, I was knocked back and Chris and his co-director devised a plot (as their software did not support my latest discoveries) which subsequently forced me to resign from Infornetics Consulting

Hence Chris and I now became competitors.

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Michael Porter – I read some of Dr Michael Porter's work, but as I do not hold any university nor post degree qualifications and after my 'run' in with the eminent Peter Drucker, I was in no state to approach Michael Porter and hence he became a competitor by default.

In November 2012 the Monitor Group, an organisation that he co-founded went into bankruptcy as it was unable to pay a hefty interest payment on a loan. The article explaining the demise of this guru's enterprise can be read by [following this link](#). Even if Dr Porter was a major player in the demise of his company, why didn't his 5 five-force analysis strategic model help save the enterprise? In my humble opinion the proposed five force analysis framework is rife with implicit information. A strategy depends totally on the knowledge implicitly stored in the minds of the major stakeholders and until the knowledge becomes explicit, the strategies will almost always fail.

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After nearly 40 years of subterfuge and deceit, I am yet to meet an (adult) ally that is only interested in furthering the aims of explicit information without any hidden agenda. If anyone reading this article feels they fit the bill, you are welcome to get in touch with me either through LinkedIn or via my email address below.

Thank you for reading this and I hope it has given you some insight as to why I state explicitly that implicit information is hazardous to the wellbeing, advocacy, sentience and sustainability of life's necessities.

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